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Since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union, the Department of Navy has had to learn how
to meet its commitments with an ever-decreasing budget.
One Navy community addressing this downsizing is the east
coast ordnance community. Because of restructuring and the
closure of Weapon Station Charleston, South Carolina, the
remaining east coast weapon stations are handling the same
amount of ordnance with fewer personnel. As a result of
the restructuring, the aircraft carriers, ordnance ships,
and large deck amphibious ships conduct ordnance transfers
at Naval Weapon Station (NWS) Earle, New Jersey. These
ships all carry air-launched missiles that have to be
maintained at Naval Weapons Station Yorktown. This thesis
develops cost equations associated with several different
methods of transportation (commercial and Department of
Defense) . These equations are used to generate cost curves
for each of four types of missiles being transported
between NWS Earle and NWS Yorktown. The curves are
analyzed, and decision policies are determined which ensure
the most cost-effective method of transportation is being
used to transport the missiles.
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Since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union, the Department of the Navy has had to learn
how to meet its commitments with an ever-decreasing budget.
One Navy community addressing this downsizing is the east
coast ordnance community. These personnel are charged with
managing approximately half of the Navy's ordnance
inventory. They have to ensure that ships preparing for
deployment have the proper ordnance load out, and they have
to offload the ordnance once the ships return from
deployment
.
Because of restructuring and the closure of Weapon
Station Charleston, SC, the remaining east coast weapon
stations are handling the same amount of ordnance with
fewer personnel. Also, as a result of the restructuring,
the aircraft carriers, ordnance ships, and large deck
amphibious ships conduct ordnance transfers at Naval Weapon
Station (NWS) Earle, NJ. These ships all carry air-
launched missiles, i.e., Harpoon, Phoenix, Sparrow, and
Sidewinder. Even though these missiles are stored, loaded,
and offloaded at NWS Earle there is no maintenance facility
at Earle. When maintenance has to be conducted on the four
types of missiles they have to be transported to NWS
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Yorktown, VA. The current method of transportation is via
commercial trucks with 48-foot flatbeds.
This thesis analyzes the current and alternative
possible transportation methods. The other methods are
commercial trucks with 20-foot End-opening containers,
commercial rail with 20-foot End-opening containers,
commercial rail boxcars, U.S. Army LSVs (Logistic Support
Vessels), and U.S. Navy AOEs (ordnance ships). The first
part of the analysis develops equations which are used to
calculate the total cost to transport a given number of
missiles using a given transportation method. Once the
equations are developed they are used to generate cost
curves. These curves show the cost incurred to transport
the missiles, for a given range of missiles (1 to a
designated maximum) . For each type of missile, a curve is
generated for each transportation method. Once all the
curves are generated they are compared graphically and
numerically to determine decision policies. These policies
give the ordnance manager the ability to determine the best
method of transportation given the number of missiles that
need to be transported. In all there are eight separate
decision policies generated, one for each missile type
being transported from NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown, and one
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for each missile type being transported from NWS Yorktown
to NWS Earle.
The results of the analysis show that in a majority of
all the eight decision policies the commercial
transportation methods cost the least to transport
missiles. In only one case does a DoD transportation
method become feasible. This occurs when Harpoons are to
be transported south from NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown. AOEs
are not a feasible option in any of the eight
missile/direction decision policies.
There are three conclusions of this analysis. The
first is that commercial transportation methods are the
most cost effective. The second is that LSVs should
generally not be utilized as a pure cost saving method of
transportation. They may become a more feasible option
when other benefits of using this asset are weighed into
the decision process, i.e., training for both Army and Navy
units. The final conclusion is that AOEs should not be
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Since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union in the late 1980' s and early 1990' s, the
Department of the Navy (DoN) has been going through a time
of transition. It has seen its fleets reduced from a large
armada of 600 ships to a compact force of almost 300 ships.
Along with the decommissioning of many ships the Navy has
closed several of its major bases. Every part of the Navy
has had to learn how to do more with less money. Each
officer, enlistee, and civilian has had to become smarter in
the way he or she utilizes available funds
.
One of the communities that has had to address
downsizing is the Navy's Ordnance community. It lost one of
its three east coast weapons stations. The Naval Weapons
Station (NWS) Charleston, South Carolina was closed as part
of the 1993 round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
process. The two remaining east coast NWSs, at Earle, NJ
and Yorktown, VA, have had to absorb Charleston's work in
addition to significantly reducing personnel . The remaining
personnel are charged with managing approximately half of
the Navy's $38 billion ordnance inventory. [Ref . 1] They
have had to ensure that ships preparing for deployment have
the proper ordnance load out, and they have to offload the
ordnance once the ships return from deployment
.
Prior to the closing of NWS Charleston, the ammunition
transfers were conceptually simple. All the AE/AOE's would
transfer at Earle; the large deck amphibious ships (LHD's
and LHA's) would transfer munitions to barges while at
anchorage at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; all the other
smaller combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and
small deck amphibious ships, etc.) were dispersed between
Earle, Yorktown, and Charleston; and the carriers
transferred munitions from/to an AE/AOE while at sea. After
NWS Charleston closed, the ships that had previously
conducted ordnance transfers there had to go to one of the
two remaining east coast weapons stations to execute the
transfers. Also, the LHD and LHA ordnance transfers were
moved to Earle due to the high costs of anchorage at
Norfolk. Presently all AE/AOE's, LHD's, LHA's, and
CV/CVN's 1 conduct ordnance transfers at Earle while the
remaining non-deployed Atlantic Fleet ships conduct ordnance
transfers at Yorktown.
The carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, and the
ordnance ships depend on NWS Earle to provide the ordnance
necessary for deployment . Since much of the ordnance
carried by these ships is expensive to procure, it is more
cost effective to repair the ordnance as needed in order to
extend the missiles' life. Some of the most expensive
ordnance carried by these ships are air-launched missiles.
Since NWS Earle has no maintenance capabilities, the air-
launched missiles have to be shipped to other facilities for
maintenance. Some of the missiles are shipped back to the
manufacturer, some are shipped to Department of Defense
(DoD) facilities throughout the United States, and some are
shipped to Yorktown, which has the only ordnance maintenance
facility on the east coast. After they are repaired, most
of these missiles must be shipped back to NWS Earle.
1 While carriers actually conduct ordnance transfers with AOE's at sea. they are counted as being
conducted at Earle because that is where the AOE's on/off-load ordnance.
Currently, 48-foot flatbed commercial trucks are used
for transferring missiles between NWS Earle and NWS
Yorktown. The Navy does not have organic trucking assets
available to conduct in-house transportation of the missiles
and must rely on the commercial sector to meet its
transportation needs. The current process will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter II.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Navy's Ordnance community does not use any type of
modeling technique to determine when to ship missiles and
how many to send. The decisions are made purely on a
reactive basis. Additionally, there has been no cost
comparison of alternative transportation methods to ensure
that the current practice is indeed the most cost effective
manner of transportation. While on experience tour at the
CINCLANTFLT Ordnance Office, during November and December of
1997, the author was asked to investigate which method of
transporting air-launched missiles would be the most cost
effective.
This thesis analyzes these issues . It suggests
alternative transportation methods and then answers the
question of which method of transportation is the most cost
effective to use. The transportation alternatives suggested
include the current commercial truck, rail car, intermodal
container on truck or rail, Navy ordnance ships (AOEs) , and
opportunity lifts from Army watercraft. To answer the
question, the analysis occurs in two steps.
The first step focuses on the individual methods of
transportation and the processes required to transport
missiles between NWS Earle and NWS Yorktown. For each
method, the different steps of the process are listed and
described. Costs for each step within each process are
determined and cost equations for each transportation method
are formulated.
The second step of the analysis takes the cost
equations for each transportation method and calculates the
cost per missile (for each missile type) . For each missile
type, i.e., Harpoon, Phoenix, Sidewinder, and Sparrow, cost
curves for each method are generated and compared to
determine the decision policy to be utilized when
determining which transportation method will be most cost
effective to transport a given number of missiles. The two
steps of analysis are further discussed in Chapter III.
C. THESIS OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter II
describes the missiles being transported, the current and
other possible methods of transportation, and discusses
basic costs incurred when transporting ordnance. Chapter
III discusses the construction of the cost equations.
Chapter IV discusses the results of the analysis. Finally,
Chapter V provides a summary and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides background information concerning
the transportation of air-launched missiles between NWS
Earle and NWS Yorktown. It first describes the use,
history, and capabilities of the four missile types
maintained at NWS Yorktown. The current process is then
described, followed by the processes associated with the
other possible transportation methods, including some being
considered by CINCLANTFLT Ordnance Logistics personnel
.
Basic costs incurred when moving ordnance are discussed in
the last portion of the chapter.
A. MISSILE TYPES
Currently only four of the many different air-launched
missiles are being shipped to NWS Yorktown for maintenance.
These are the AIM- 7 Sparrow, the AIM- 9 Sidewinder, the AIM-
54 Phoenix, and the AGM-74 Harpoon.
The AIM- 7 Sparrow is a medium- range, radar-guided, air-
to-air missile. The development of the missile commenced
with the Sparrow 1 program in 1946. The Sparrow 2 program
was started in 1955 but was canceled in 1958, and the
current missile, the Sparrow 3, program development started
in 1955 with the AIM-7C Sparrow entering service in the Navy
in 1958. Since entering service the missile design has gone
through several changes, most of which have dealt with the
missile's guidance, propulsion, warhead, and counter-measure
capabilities. The most current version of the missile is
the AIM-7P, with the AIM-7R in development. The current
version uses a semi-active radar to home in on its target.
The aircraft firing the missile illuminates the target with
its onboard radar, and the missile follows the radar returns
to the target. The missile is approximately 3.66 meters
long, has a launch weight of 230 kilograms, has a 39
kilogram High Explosive (HE) blast/fragmentation warhead,
and has a range of 45 kilometers. [Ref . 2] It is currently
carried on the Navy's F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18 Hornet. Also,
a shipboard version of the Sparrow has been developed as a
surface-to-air anti-aircraft defense missile. (See Figure 1)
The AIM- 9 Sidewinder is a short range, infrared guided,
air-to-air missile. Development of the Sidewinder program
started in the late 1940' s. The first generation of the
missile, the AIM-9B, entered service in 1956. The missile
system has gone through several developmental changes over
the years, with the AIM-9M and AIM-9S being the most current
versions in the fleet. The main difference between the 9M
and 9S is that the 9S contain a slightly larger warhead.
All the versions of the Sidewinder use an Infrared guidance
system that homes in on the exhaust emitted from the target
aircraft. The missile is approximately 2.87 meters long,
weighs 87 kilograms, has a 10 kilogram HE fragmentation
warhead, and has a range of 8 kilometers. [Ref . 3] It is
carried on the Navy's F-14 Tomcat, F/A-18 Hornet, and the
Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier. The Air Force has developed an
air-to-air version of the Sidewinder, and the Army developed
the MIM-72 Chaparral which is a surface-to-air variant of
the Sidewinder. (See Figure 1)
I.;
Figure 1. Size comparison of sparrow
(foreground) , Sidewinder (Middle) , and
Harpoon (rear) . [Ref . 2]
The AIM-54 Phoenix is a long-range, radar-guided, air-
to-air missile. The development of the missile commenced in
1960 with production starting in 1972. The first missiles
were delivered to the fleet in 1974. The latest version,
the AIM-54C, entered the fleet in 1985. During the height
of the Cold War, the Phoenix was utilized as the first line
of defense for an U.S. aircraft carrier against attacking
Soviet aircraft. The missile uses semi-active radar during
mid- course flight and uses onboard active radar during the
terminal phase of flight. It is approximately 3.96 meters
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long, weights 463 kilograms, has a 60 -kilogram HE Continuous
Rod warhead, and has a range of 150 kilometers. [Ref . 5]
The only Naval aircraft that carries the Phoenix is the F-14
Tomcat. (See Figure 2)
Figure 2. F-14 carrying six Phoenix missiles.
[Ref. 4]
The AGM-54A Harpoon is a long-range, radar and infrared
guided, air-to-surface missile. It was designed to be an
air-launched anti-ship missile to offset the growing threat
of destroyers, submarines, and fast patrol boats equipped
with anti-ship missiles. The development of the missile
started in 1971 with the first missile entering the fleet in
1977 . Shipboard and submarine versions of the missile have
also been developed and are in service. The air-launched
11
version of the missile utilizes active radar to locate and
home in on a target. The warhead is designed to delay-
explosion until it has penetrated the hull of the target
ship to allow for optimal destruction. It can be carried on
the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet. The missile is approximately 3.85
meters long, weights 556 kilograms, uses a 222 kilogram HE
Blast Penetration warhead, and has a range of 120
kilometers. [Ref . 7] (See Figure 1)
B. CURRENT PROCESS
The three ship types that carry the majority of the
four air-launched missiles discussed earlier are the AE,
AOE, and CV/CVN. The large -deck amphibious ships (LHD and
LHA) carry only the Sidewinders and in quantities much less
than the ordnance ships and carriers. All of the AE's are
in the process of being decommissioned and transferred to
the Military Seal ift Command (MSC) . There are no current
plans to have the AE's deploy with battlegroups . The last
of the east coast AE's, the USS SANTA BARBARA, conducted her
final deployment in early 1998. Because of this only the
four Atlantic Fleet AOE's are considered in this thesis.
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When a carrier battlegroup deploys, an AOE accompanies
it. It is the AOE's responsibility to provide fuel,
ordnance, and limited stores to the ships in the
battlegroup. Prior to deployment the AOE receives its
initial load of ordnance known as the Delta ordnance load.
This is the load which is used to replenish the carrier and
other ships.
A non-deploying AOE is utilized to transport ordnance
to the carrier preparing for deployment. The carrier will
receive part of its Bravo load prior to work-up Exercises
and will receive the remaining portion of its load-out just
prior to deployment. The Bravo load is the carrier's
initial load it carries to its area of deployment. Once the
six-month deployment is completed the AOE that deployed with
the battlegroup returns to homeport (Earle) and is
designated the "ready ship" for a 30 day period. After the
30 days are up the ship can off-load its ordnance. When the
carrier returns from deployment it remains the ready carrier
(on call to deploy again if needed) until the carrier
preparing for deployment has been certified as ready to
deploy. Once the returning carrier is no longer the ready
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carrier it can offload its ordnance. The ordnance is
transferred to a non-deployed AOE while at sea. The AOE
then returns to Earle and offloads the ordnance.
The ordnance from returning carriers and AOEs
eventually gets offloaded at Earle. At least 30 days prior
to an offload occurring, NWS Earle generates a preliminary
offload plan that details what ordnance is to be offloaded.
After the preliminary offload plan has been developed the
types of conveyances (rail car or truck) are determined and
ordered. Approximately 2 weeks prior to the offload a pre-
arrival conference, composed of NWS Earle Logistics Support
Team and Waterfront Accountability Team members, takes
place. At this time the ship provides a list of the
ordnance to be offloaded and where the ordnance is located
on the ship. This information allows personnel at NWS Earle
to plan the offload sequence.
Once the ship arrives at NWS Earle the offload of
ordnance begins. Whenever possible, a receipt inspection
team boards the ship prior to the beginning of the offload
and locates, inspects, and matches the ordnance with the
lists previously provided by the ship. During this
14
inspection the condition of the ordnance is confirmed, and
once the condition is determined an Ammunition Condition
Code (ACC) is given to the piece of ordnance. Air-launched
missiles that receive an ACC of E, F, or G are deemed
unserviceable and must be transferred to a maintenance
facility. While the offload is taking place the foreman on
the pier determines and orders the number of commercial
trucks that are needed to ultimately transport missiles to
Yorktown
.
Current guidance for transporting missiles directs NWS
Earle to transfer the following missiles to NWS Yorktown:
Sparrows and Sidewinders if unserviceable or within 18
months of their Maintenance Due Date (MDD) ; all Phoenix's,
whether serviceable or unserviceable; and all unserviceable
Harpoons. [Ref . 8]
The current process for transferring missiles between
Earle and Yorktown begins when the missiles are removed from
the ship and placed on rail cars . These rail cars are owned
by the weapons stations and used as material handling
equipment to move ordnance to various locations on base . At
the end of each day, the rail cars containing the air-
15
launched missiles awaiting transfer to Yorktown via
commercial truck are moved to a barricade area, which is
approximately 17 miles from the pier. The barricade area
consists of a set of covered magazines that are designed so
the rail cars can pass through. When the commercial trucks
arrive, the missiles are transferred from the rail cars to
commercial trucks with 48 -foot flatbeds. (See Figure 3)
Once the missiles are secured to the flatbeds they are then







Figure 3. 48 -Foot Flatbed loaded with 12 Phoenix
missiles. [Ref. 7]
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Upon arrival in Yorktown the missiles are removed from
the flatbeds and placed in ordnance storage magazines. The
missiles remain in the magazine until they are moved to the
production facility. Once maintenance or repairs have been
completed, the missile is placed back in the ordnance
storage magazine.
At some point the repaired missiles are requested to be
transported back to NWS Earle. These requests are generated
for several reasons, including a Weapon Station Load Plan
adjustment, shipfill, mission loads, or cargo loads. Once
there is a request for missiles to be transported to NWS
Earle the number of commercial trucks and 48 -foot flatbeds
are determined and ordered. The missiles are loaded onto
the 48 -foot flatbeds and then transported to Earle. Once
the missiles arrive at Earle they are offloaded and placed
either in storage magazines or loaded onto an awaiting ship.
C. OTHER POSSIBLE TRANSPORTATION METHODS
Having described the current process of transporting
missiles from Earle to Yorktown, this section describes the
five other possible transportation methods . These methods
are commercial truck with containers, rail cars with
17
containers, rail boxcars, U.S. Army LSVs, and U.S. Navy
AOEs.
The first method, which is similar to the current
method, utilizes commercial trucks but instead of using
flatbeds, the missiles are stored in 20-foot ISO
(International Standards Organization) End-opening
containers. (See Figure 4) These containers are 8 feet high
by 8 feet wide by 20 feet long, and are the same as standard
commercial containers except that the door- end cornerposts
are modified with angle iron to allow for the use of wooden
dunnage without disturbing the force to the door. [Ref . 10]
The containers have forklift pockets along the bottom so no
specialized handling equipment is needed to move the
containers. The transportation process in this case is very
similar to the current process using 48 -foot flatbed trucks
except that instead of loading the missiles onto flatbeds at
the barricade site, the missiles are loaded into containers
on chassis. Once the missiles are loaded they can
immediately leave for NWS Yorktown. The process for
transporting the missiles north via 20 -foot End- opening
18
containers is the same as with 48-foot flatbed trucks. (See
Figure 4)










Figure 4. 20-foot End-opening
Container. [Ref. 14]
The second method incorporates the 20 -foot End- opening
containers but instead of transporting the loaded containers
via commercial trucks, the containers are placed on standard
rail flatcars
.
With this process the containers have to be
on the ground in order for missiles to be loaded or
offloaded. Once the containers are loaded they are then
placed on the flatcars using standard forklifts already-
available at the weapons stations. Four 20-foot containers
can be placed on one rail flatcar. All .of the other aspects
pertaining to the process for transporting missiles via
19
containers on rail flatcars remain the same as the previous
processes.
The third possible method utilizes rail but the
missiles are placed in standard commercial 50 -foot, 6 -inch
boxcars. (See Figure 5) The boxcars are loaded at the
barricade site at NWS Earle, transported to Yorktown, and
offloaded to storage magazines at Yorktown. When missiles
are scheduled to return to NWS Earle, the commercial boxcars
are ordered; the missiles are then loaded onto the boxcars
and transported back to Earle to be either offloaded to
storage magazines or to a ship.
Even though both of the methods that utilize rail
assets can theoretically go onto the pier and receive the
missiles coming directly off the ship, this will not happen
because it would lengthen the time required to offload the
ship. The requirements for securing missiles for transport
off the weapons stations are more stringent than for
securing the missiles to the weapon station's rail cars for
on-site movement. Because of these increased requirements
it takes longer to load the containers or boxcars, which in
turn slows down the offload process, thus causing the ship
20
to remain pierside at Earle longer. As a general practice
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Figure 5. Standard commercial 50 -foot, 6-
inch boxcar. [Ref . 9]
In the fourth method instead of using commercial assets
to transport the missiles, DoD assets are utilized. This
method greatly modifies the transport process by utilizing
AOEs (ordnance ships - see Figure 6) as shuttle ships to
transfer the missiles When ships offload missiles
requiring further transfer to NWS Yorktown, the missiles
would have to be placed in a magazine at NWS Earle to await
the next shuttle AOE.
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Once a quarter, an AOE not scheduled to deploy in the
next six months will transfer all missiles headed for
Yorktown and then return with all missiles requiring
transfer from Yorktown to Earle. Once the AOE is loaded
with the missiles heading for Yorktown, the AOE gets
underway and travels south to Naval Operational Base
Norfolk. The AOE does not actually go pierside at NWS
Yorktown due to its size but anchors at Golf anchorage which
is part of NOB Norfolk. The missiles destined for Yorktown
are offloaded to barges, and missiles destined for Earle are
loaded from other barges . The barges containing the
offloaded missiles are towed by commercial tugs
approximately 40 miles up the York River to NWS Yorktown.
Once at Yorktown the missiles are removed from the barges
and placed in storage magazines. The missiles that are
requested for transfer to Earle are loaded onto barges and
then towed to the awaiting AOE in Norfolk.
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Figure 6. USS SUPPLY (AOE 6). [Ref. 10]
The fifth and final method utilizes U.S. Army LSVs
(Logistic Support Vessels - see Figure 7) . These vessels
are charged with moving ordnance for all services in time of
war. However, the Army personnel have never been trained in
moving break-bulk ordnance. In partnership with the Navy,
the three vessels stationed at Ft. Eustis in Newport News,
Virginia have been used in four Joint Ordnance Movement
Exercises (JORD MOVEX) to date. There are two purposes of
these exercises. One is to train the Army stevedores in
onloading and offloading naval ordnance; the second is to
move Naval ordnance. The only costs to the Navy when using
the LSVs is for fuel and handling the missiles. Currently,
the Navy is trying to schedule two JORD MOVEX' s per year.
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Figure 7. U.S. Army LSV. [Ref. 11]
The offload process has to be modified if the LSVs are
to be used on a regular basis to transport missiles between
Earle and Yorktown. Since the LSVs are available at most
twice a year, the unserviceable missiles offloaded at Earle
may have to be placed into long term storage magazines
awaiting the next LSV exercise. As part of the JORD MOVEX,
the LSV onloads any serviceable missiles at Yorktown that
need to be transferred to Earle, transits the approximate
360 nautical miles to Earle and offloads the missiles. The
LSV then onloads any unserviceable missiles bound for
Yorktown at Earle and then transports them to Yorktown. If
the JORD MOVEX' s are scheduled in conjunction with the major
offloads at Earle (either an AOE returning from deployment
or the non-deploying AOE offloading the carriers ordnance)
,
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then the amount of time the unserviceable missiles are
stored at Earle will be minimized.
D. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTING ORDNANCE
There are several costs incurred when transporting
ordnance between NWS Earle and NWS Yorktown. Some examples
are manpower utilized during the ordnance handling
evolutions; inspections of trucks and rail cars prior to
departure from one weapons station and upon arrival at
another one; blocking and bracing, which refers to the
securing of the ordnance on the truck or container for the
trip; the holding cost at a weapons station; and the cost of
transportation itself, i.e., the truck, rail car, LSV, or
AOE.
These and any other additional costs are covered under
two DoD funds. The first is the Service Worldwide
Transportation (SWT) fund. The fund is used when commercial
assets are utilized to transport munitions and thus would
pay for the actual truck or rail car, and the fuel for the
LSV. The handling personnel and inspectors are paid a
standardized wage which comes from the Navy's Receipt,
Securing, Storage, and Inspection (RSS&I) budget. The cost
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of holding ordnance in magazines also comes from this fund.




This chapter is concerned with the costs associated
with transporting missiles, especially those costs which
differ between the various transportation methods. There
are three different groups of cost elements discussed in
this chapter. The cost elements which are not affected by-
modal choice, and hence not included in the calculations,
are discussed first . The cost elements which vary with the
number of missiles being transported are discussed second.
Finally, the cost elements that vary with the number of
vehicles are discussed last. The final section of this
chapter develops and discusses the equations utilized during
the analysis. These equations are used to calculate the
total cost to transport a given number of missiles, via a
given transportation method. Cost curves are then generated
for each transportation type over a range of missiles and
then the curves are compared graphically and numerically to
determine the most cost effective method of transportation.
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A. OMITTED COSTS
There are several aspects of each transportation
process that are omitted from the analysis. The reason for
the omissions is that these costs occur in each process,
with the same value, and if included, they would just
inflate all the costs generated by the equations at the same
rate and add no information as to what the true total
variable cost is. Thus, these cost elements would have no
impact on mode choice. The first of these cost elements is
the cost incurred when missiles are offloaded at Earle from
ships returning from deployment. These missiles are
offloaded at the same cost no matter which type of
transportation method is utilized. The second cost element
is incurred when ships preparing for deployment onload
missiles at Earle. Again, the costs are the same no matter
the transportation method. The third cost element is the
cost to store missiles at the weapons stations . This is the
same for both weapons stations, therefore adding no new
information to the cost equations. Finally, the fourth cost
element that is the same for all the six transportation
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processes is the cost to maintain and repair missiles at
Yorktown.
B. COSTS VARYING WITH THE NUMBER OF MISSILES
This section is concerned with the cost elements that
vary with the number of missiles that require transport in a
given movement . The two cost elements that vary with the
number of missiles are the loading cost and the unloading
cost . The loading cost is the cost incurred when one
missile is loaded onto a transportation vehicle, i.e.
flatbed, container, boxcar, LSV, or AOE. The unloading cost
is incurred when one missile is unloaded from a
transportation vehicle. Each of these costs are multiplied
by the number of missiles requiring transport and cause the
total cost of transportation to increase as the number of
missiles increases.
The load and unload costs are generated by multiplying
a standard hourly wage by the number of man-hours needed to
complete the task. Table 1 shows the man-hours needed to
perform the different tasks at Earle and Yorktown. These
man-hours are associated with the four commercial
transportation methods only. The man-hours needed to load
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and unload a missile traveling on a DoD transportation
method are not listed because the data associated with the
DoD methods was received already in the form of cost per
missile to load or unload a missile.
Missile Load at bane unload at bane Load at Yorktown unload at Yorwown
Harpon 7.83 3.58 11.45 16.55
Phoenix 2.05 0.94 3 4.34
Sidewinder 0.42 U.19 0.62 0.89
sparrow U.93 0.42 1.36 1.96
Table 1. Man-hours to load or unload missiles (for
commercial methods only). [Ref. 12]
C. COSTS VARYING WITH THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES
This section discusses the cost elements that vary as
the number of vehicles required to transport missiles
changes The cost elements are transport rates and
inspection costs
.
In the commercial sector transport rates for a given
transportation method can vary depending on the distance,
weight of the freight to be transported, or the amount of
freight to be transported. In this analysis the transport
rates (or rental rates) are fixed and will not vary because
the distance between NWS Earle and NWS Yorktown for each of
the commercial transportation methods is below minimum
distances for the commercial carriers, and the weight of
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commercial vehicles, fully loaded with missiles, does not
exceed the minimum weights published by the commercial
carriers . The transport rates for the two DoD
transportation methods (LSV and AOE) are the cost for fuel
needed for a one way trip, either from Earle to Yorktown or
from Yorktown to Earle.
The inspection costs are costs incurred when vehicles
are either loaded or unloaded. The inspection for a vehicle
that is being loaded is a visual inspection that checks the
securing of the missiles prior to transport. The unload
inspection occurs when a vehicle arrives at a weapons
station and is also visual . The purpose of the unload
inspection is to ensure that there has been no shifting of
the missiles while in transit that may cause a hazardous
situation during the offload of the vehicle. The total cost
equations for the DoD transportation methods (LSV and AOE)
do not have a separate inspection term because the
inspection costs are incorporated into the load and unload
costs discussed in the previous section. In part, this is
because the cost data associated with the DoD methods was
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received in a different format than the cost data associated
with the commercial methods
.
An example of the data associated with the
transportation rates and inspection costs are given in Table
2 . Column B shows that the transportation rate generally
increases as the size of the vehicle increases. When these
values are divided by the vehicle capacity (column C)
,
we
see that the average cost per missile, for a full load
(column D)
,



















load, (D + E)
Truck (Container) $ 1,401.00 24 $ 58.38 $ 3.86 $ 62.23
Truck (Flatbed) $ 1,427.00 72 $ 19.82 $ 1.29 $ 21.11
Rail (Boxcar) $ 2,830.00 90 $ 31.44 $ 1.03 $ 32.47
Rail (Container) $ 2,830.00 95 $ 29.48 $ 0.95 $ 30.44
AOE $26,506.12 4b00" $ 5.89 $ 5.89
LSV $11,500.00 4500** $ 2.56 $ 2.56
* These values are not dependent on missile type.
** These values are just estimates and cause the cost per missile to be suspect. Also, the cost per missile is
unrealistic because the vessels have such large capacities that they would never be filled with a full load.
Table 2. Transportation Rate and Inspection costs associated with
transporting Sparrow missiles.
The inspection cost per vehicle is $92.60 for all
commercial vehicle types . This cost incorporates both the
load and unload inspection costs and is based on the man-
hours required to conduct the inspections . The man-hours
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needed to conduct a load inspection are 0.5, and the man-
hours needed to conduct a unload inspection are 0.33. By-
adding the man-hours together and then multiplying by the
standard hourly wage ($111.57/man-hour) the total inspection
cost is calculated. The inspection cost per missile with
full loads is presented in column E. We see that this cost
generally decreases as the vehicle size increases . The
final column shows the total cost per missile
(transportation and inspection) with full loads.
D. TOTAL COST EQUATIONS
Each method and missile combination has two equations
utilized to calculate the total transportation cost, one for
transporting the missiles from NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown
(called SOUTH equations) and one for transporting the
missiles from NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle (called NORTH
equations) . In general terms, the total cost (TC) equations
per movement are of the form:
Total Cost = (missiles*$/missile) + (vehicles*$/vehicle)
.
The first part of the equation is made up of the costs
that vary with the number of missiles and the second part is
made up of the costs that vary with the number of vehicles
.
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The following subsections describe the generation of the
SOUTH and NORTH equations. Even though the equations for
each transportation method have the same general format, the
generation and description of the equations is broken into
two sections, one for commercial methods and another for DoD
methods. The reason for this split is because of the
difference in format of the cost data between the commercial
and DoD methods
.
1. Cost Equations For Commercial Transportation
Methods
The equations that are used to calculate the total cost
to transport the missiles south and north are of the same
format for all the commercial transportation methods. The
formulation of the equations are as follows:
Index
i - missile type
j - commercial transportation type
k - load/unload location (Earle, Yktn)
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Data
CAP i:j - capacity of missile i on trans type j .
WAGE - standardized hourly rate for weapon
station personnel
.
LD_HRS ijk - man-hours required to load one missile
type i onto trans type j at location k.
UNLD_HRS ijk - man-hours required to unload one missile
type i from trans type j at location k.
LD_INSPijk - man-hours to inspect trans type j ; loaded
with missile type i, at location k prior
to departure
.
UNLD_INSPijk - man-hours to inspect trans type j , loaded
with missile type i, at location k prior
to offload.








i;j = (WAGE*LD_HRS ij#Earl.)*xij + (WAGE*UNLD_HRS ij/Yktn ) *xi:j
+ [RATE + (WAGE*LD_INSPij<Earle ) +
(WAGE*UNLD_INSPij/YktB ) ] * ROUNDUP (x^/CAP^) .
TCNTH
i:i








Earle ) 3 * ROUNDUP (x±j /CAP i;j ) .
The constant WAGE used in the equations is a
standardized hourly wage of $111.57 for one ordnance handler
at either weapons station. LD_HRS ijk gives the man-hours
needed to load a missile of type i onto transportation type
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j at location k. When LD_HRS ijk is multiplied with WAGE the
resulting calculation gives the cost to load one missile
type i on transportation type j . UNLD_HRS ijk gives the man-
hours required to unload a missile of type i off
transportation type j at location k, and when multiplied
with WAGE results in the cost to unload one missile type i,
from transportation type j, at location k. This makes up
the second portion of the equations
.
The third portion calculates the costs that vary with
the number of vehicles. The transportation rate and
inspection cost are added together and then multiplied by
the number of vehicles needed to transport the given
missiles. The ROUNDUP function utilized in this portion of
the total cost equations allows for the automatic increase
in the number of assets needed for each type of method.
This function generates a positive integer which gives the
number of vehicles needed. For example, assume nine
Harpoons need to be transported via commercial trucks with
48-foot flatbeds. Since the capacity of a single flatbed is
eight Harpoons, ROUNDUP (9/8) = 2, which means that two
trucks and flatbeds are needed. This function ensures the
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correct rental cost for the trucks and flatbeds is
calculated.
The results of the total cost equations gives the cost
to transport any number of missiles (in dollars) , either
north or south.
To demonstrate these equations the total cost to
transport fifteen Harpoons, on commercial trucks with 48-
foot flatbeds, from NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown is calculated.
The applicable data for this missile/method/direction
combination is shown in Table 3
.
WAGE 111.57* $/manhr
LOAD_HRSHarpoon pitbed, Earle 7.83* manhr/missile
UNLOAD_HRSHarpoon Fltbd Yktn 16.55* manhr/missile









* Ref. 12, ** Ref. 13, *** Ref. U
Table 3. Data associated with transporting
Harpoon missiles from Earle to Yorktown
utilizing flatbed trucks.
By applying these numbers to the SOUTH equation the
cost to transport the Harpoons south is $43,840.36.
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2. Cost Equations For DoD Transportation Methods
This section discusses the equations used to calculate
the cost to transport a given number of missiles between
Earle and Yorktown via the DoD transportation methods (LSV
and AOE) . The main difference between these equations and
the equations from the previous section is that the LD_INSP
and UNLD_INSP terms are not explicitely used in the
equations. As stated earlier, these costs are imbedded in
the cost to load and unload missiles to and from the DoD
assets
.
The formulation of the equations generated for the DoD
transportation methods are similar to the equations for the
commercial methods. The equations are listed below. All
indices, data, and variables not explicitely listed below
(and used in the equations) are the same as listed in the
commercial formulation in the previous section.
Data
LOADijk - cost to load one missile type i on
transportation type j at location k.
UNLOADijk - cost to unload one missile of type i from










RATE >ROUNDUP (Xij/CAP^) .
LOAD ij(Yktn* Xij + UNLOAD iitMmAm*Xii +
RATE
j
*ROUNDUP(xij /CAPij ) .








To give the reader a comparison of the costs for
transporting a given number of each type of missile being
transported by each type of transportation method (both
commercial and DoD) , Tables 4 and 5 show the cost to
transport one missile via each of the transportation types.
The data used to calculate these costs are given in Appendix
Harpoon ^noenix Sidewinder sparrow
48-foot Flatbed $ 4,239.68 $ 2,232.54 $ 1,665.76 $ 1,842.04
Truck with container $ 4,213.68 $ 2,206.54 $ 1,639.76 $ 1,816.04
Rail with container $ 5,642.68 $ 3,635.54 $ 3,068.76 $ 3,245.04
Rail Boxcar $ 5,642.68 $ 3,635.54 $ 3,068.76 $ 3,245.04
LSV $ 13,610.52 $ 12,523.68 $11,726.01 $12,138.14
AOE $ 36,674.18 $ 34,108.10 $32,224.74 $33,197.81
Table 4. Cost to transport one missile south.
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Harpoon Phoenix Sidewinder Sparrow
48-foot Flatbed $ 3,196.50 $ 1,959.19 $ 1,609.97 $ 1,718.20
Truck with container $ 3,170.50 $ 1,933.19 $ 1,583.97 $ 1,696.66
Rail with container $ 4,599.50 $ 3,362.19 $ 3,019.97 $ 3,121.20
Rail Boxcar $ 4,599.50 $ 3,362.19 $ 3,019.97 $ 3,121.20
LSV $ 13,610.52 $ 12,523.68 $11,726.01 $12,138.14
AOE $ 33,883.95 $ 32./54V2 $31,925.95 $32,354.14
Table 5. Cost to transport one missile north,
E. COST CURVE GENERATION
The generation of the missile cost curves is the next
step in the analysis. These curves are generated by using
the total cost equations from the previous sections to
calculate the cost to transport any number of missiles, from
one missile up to a designated maximum number The
designated maximum number of missiles is based on the number
of each missile type in the Navy's east coast inventory.
Table 6 shows the range of missiles used in the analysis for
each type of missile. These numbers do not add up to the
exact number of missiles in the east coast inventory, but










Table 6 . Cost Curve Ranges
.
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To generate the curves a spreadsheet program is
utilized. The layout of the spreadsheet is provided in
Appendix B. Each missile type is treated separately, and
the cost curves for all six transportation methods are
generated for both the transporting of missiles from NWS
Earle to NWS Yorktown and NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle. There






This chapter discusses the results of the analysis.
For each missile type a decision policy is generated. These
policies (eight in all) will ensure the most cost effective
method is utilized, given the number of missiles needing
transport
.
After the cost curves for each transportation method
are generated for a given missile type (going in one
direction) , the curves are compared (graphically and
numerically) to determine if any breakpoints exist within
the range of missiles being analyzed. A breakpoint occurs
when two cost curves intersect. For example, a breakpoint
is seen to occur when 41 Sidewinders need to be transported
from Yorktown to Earle. The two methods involved at this
breakpoint are trucks with containers and trucks with
flatbeds. To the left of the breakpoint a truck with
containers is the least expensive method, and above the
breakpoint a truck with a flatbed is the least expensive
method. Since many of the cost curves (for a given missile
type and direction) are close together, comparing them
graphically may only give an approximate range of missiles
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where a breakpoint is located. To determine the exact
location of the breakpoint, each point within the range must
be numerically compared for each transportation method
around the intersection area. Once all breakpoints are
determined for a given missile type and transportation
method, the decision policy is generated. The following
sections detail the comparisons and resulting decision
policies. The axes in the graphs shown in the following
sections have been adjusted to give the viewer the greatest
detail possible so that breakpoints are viewable
.
A. HARPOON
1. NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown
The results of the comparison of the six cost curves
associated with transporting Harpoon missiles from NWS Earle
to NWS Yorktown show that five of the six methods can
feasibly be used in the decision policy. The graphs of the
six curves and their relationships with each other are shown
in Figure 8
.
Observing Figure 8 it can be seen that the method of
using an AOE as a shuttle ship is not economically feasible;
the methods of Truck (Flatbed) , Truck (Container) , Rail
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(Container) , and Rail (Boxcar) are reasonably close
together, and the best method to use can not be easily
determined. By comparing the remaining five methods
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Figure 8. HARPOON (South Cost Curves) 2 .
of this comparison the decision policy to use to transport
Harpoons from Earle to Yorktown is as follows:
• Use trucks with containers for one to six Harpoons.
2 The x-axis range has been adjusted for this graph (and all the following graphs) to show the maximum
detail. The actual range used in the analysis is shown in Table 6.
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• Use trucks with flatbeds for seven to eight
Harpoons
.
• Use either rail with containers or rail with boxcars
for nine to 14 Harpoons
.
• Use LSV for any number of Harpoons greater then 14
.
• Use AOE only as a last resort if none of the above
methods are available.
When the number of missiles that needs to be
transported south is between nine and thirteen either of the
two rail options will be the most cost effective. This
result is because of several factors. The first is that the
rent cost for either a railcar with containers or a rail
boxcar is the same. Because the distance between NWS Earle
and NWS Yorktown is below the minimum distance for
commercial rail rates, and because the weight of the
missiles does not exceed 100,000 lbs., the rental rate for
both methods is given the same value. The second factor
that causes the curves to be equal is that the capacity for
both of the methods is 24 Harpoons. Since the cost to load
and unload one harpoon is the same for both methods,
handling the same number of missiles leads to the same cost.
Because of these two factors the numerical results for the
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two methods are equal. This result also holds true for
transporting Harpoons north from NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle.
The numerical findings for the cost curves associated
with transporting Harpoons south are provided in Appendix C.
2. NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle
The results of the comparison of the six cost curves
associated with transporting Harpoon missiles from NWS
Yorktown to NWS Earle show that only four of the methods are
used in the decision policy. The graphs of the six curves
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Figure 9. HARPOON (NORTH Cost Curves!
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Observing the graph shows that the LSV and AOE cost
curves are always above the other four methods and thus are
not included in this decision policy. The decision policy
is
• Use trucks with containers for one to six Harpoons
• Use trucks with flatbeds for seven to eight
Harpoons
.
• Use either rail with containers or boxcars for any
number of Harpoon missiles greater then eight
.
• Use LSV only if the above methods four methods are
not available.
• Use AOE only as a last resort
.
The difference between the decision policies for
Harpoons going north and Harpoons going south is caused by
the high difference in man-hours required to handle Harpoons
at Earle and Yorktown. In the case of Harpoons going south
the combination of the man-hours to load at Earle and to
unload at Yorktown causes the slopes of the curves for the
commercial methods to be high enough so that they intersect
with the curve for the LSV. The costs to transport Harpoons
north for trucks with flatbeds, trucks with containers, rail
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with containers, and rail with boxcars are all approximately
sixty percent less than transporting them south.
B . PHOENIX
1. NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown
The results of the comparison of the six cost curves
associated with transporting Phoenix missiles from NWS Earle
to NWS Yorktown show that four of the six methods are used
in the decision policy. The four methods are trucks with
flatbeds, trucks with containers, rail with containers, and
rail with boxcars. The graphs of the six curves and their

























Figure 10. PHOENIX (SOUTH Cost Curves)
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Figure 10 shows that the AOE and LSV methods will not
be part of the decision policy. As a result of the
comparison of the numerical values the decision policy to
use to transport Phoenix missiles from Earle to Yorktown is
as follows:
• Use trucks with containers for one to 12 Phoenix
missiles.
• Use trucks with flatbeds for 13 to 24 Phoenix
missiles.
• Use either rail with containers or rail with boxcars
for 25 through 48 Phoenix missiles.
• Use truck with flatbeds to transport 49 through 72
Phoenix missiles.
• Use either rail with containers or rail with boxcars
to transport 73 through 96 Phoenix missiles.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 97 through 120
Phoenix missiles.
• Use LSV only if no commercial assets are available.
• Use AOE only as a last resort if none of the above
methods are available
.
As with Harpoons, when the decision policy states to
use rail, either rail with containers or rail boxcars can be
used. The reason for this is because the rental cost and
cost per missile for both methods is the same.
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2. NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle
The results from comparing the cost curves associated
with transporting Phoenix missiles from Yorktown to Earle
shows that trucks with flatbeds, trucks with containers,
rail with containers, and rail boxcars are the only methods
























Figure 11. Phoenix (NORTH Cost Curves).
The comparison of the cost curves for transporting
Phoenix missiles north shows that the LSV and AOE methods
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are too costly to be effective. The decision policy for
moving Phoenix's north are listed as follows:
• Use trucks with containers to move one through 12
Phoenix missiles.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 13 through 24
missiles.
• Use either rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 25 through 48 missiles.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 49 through 72
missiles
.
• Use either rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 73 through 96 missiles.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 97 through 120
missiles
• Use LSVs only if commercial assets are not
available.
• Use AOEs only as a last resort.
C . SIDEWINDER
1. NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown
Analysis of the cost curves for each of the methods
moving Sidewinders south reveals that the decision policy is
made up of only the truck with containers, truck with
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Figure 12. SIDEWINDER (SOUTH Cost Curves)
The decision policy for transporting Sidewinders south
is as follows:
• Use trucks with containers to transport one to 40
Sidewinders
.
• Use trucks with flatcars to transport 41 to 96
Sidewinders.
• Use rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 97 to 160 missiles.
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• Use trucks with flatcars to transport 161 to 288
missiles
.
• Use rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 289 to 320 missiles.
• Use rail boxcars to transport 321 to 950 missiles.
• Use LSV if no commercial assets are available.
• Use AOEs if there is no other way to transport the
missiles.
The jumping back and forth between trucks with flatbeds
and rail boxcars is due to multiple places where the two
cost curves intersect. These intersections take place when
the method associated with the lower curve goes over it's
capacity ,i.e., a new boxcar is needed, which causes a jump
in the curve due to another rental and inspection cost being
added into the cost
.
2. NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle
The methods that prove to be the most cost effective to
transport Sidewinders north are the same ones used to
transport them south. The relationships between the cost
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Figure 13. SIDEWINDER (NORTH Cost Curve).
The decision policy for transporting Sidewinders from
Yorktown to Earle is
:
• Use truck with containers to transport one to 40
Sidewinders
.
• Use truck with flatbeds to transport 41 to 96
missiles
.
• Use rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 97 to 160 missiles.
• Use rail boxcars to transport 161 to 240 missiles
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• Use truck with flatbeds to transport 241 to 288
missiles
.
• Use rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 289 to 320 missiles.
• Use rail boxcars to transport 321 to 950 missiles
• Use LSV if no commercial methods are available.
• Use AOE's if no other method is available.
D . SPARROW
1. NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown
The conclusion from the analysis of the Sparrow SOUTH
cost curves is that truck with containers, truck with
flatbeds, and rail with containers are the methods utilized
in the decision policy. The policy is:
• Use trucks with containers to transport one to 24
Sparrows
.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 25 to 72
Sparrows
• Use rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 73 to 96 Sparrows
.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 97 to 380
Sparrows
• Use LSV only if no commercial assets are available.
• Use AOEs only as a last resort.
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The graph of the cost curves generated for Sparrows





























Figure 14. SPARROW (SOUTH Cost Curves).
2. NWS Yorktown to NWS Earle
The methods that are used in the decision policy when
transporting Sparrow missiles north are trucks with
containers, trucks with flatbeds, and rail with containers.














Figure 15. SPARROW (NORTH Cost Curves).
The decision policy associated with transporting
Sparrows from Yorktown to Earle is as follows:
• Use trucks with containers to transport one to five
Sparrows
.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport six to 72
missiles
• Use rail with containers or rail boxcars to
transport 73 to 96 missiles.
• Use trucks with flatbeds to transport 97 to 380
Sparrows
• Use LSV if no commercial assets are available.
• Use AOEs only as a last resort when no other methods
of transportation are available.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides a summary of the original problem
and the analysis conducted. The second section discusses
the conclusions of the author' s research and makes
recommendations. The final section of this chapter
discusses follow-on research that can be done.
A. SUMMARY
The Navy, along with the rest of the Department of
Defense, is having to perform many of the same tasks that it
has historically performed but on a tighter budget that
continues to shrink. Because of this everyone is having to
learn to utilize all available funds in the most productive
manner. This problem has led CINCLANTFLT to ask the
question of which is the most cost effective method of
transporting air-launched missiles between NWS Earle and NWS
Yorktown. The six possible methods of transporting these
missiles, commercial trucks with 48-foot flatbeds,
commercial trucks with 20 -foot End-opening containers,
commercial rail flatcars with 20 -foot containers, commercial
rail boxcars, U.S. Navy ordnance ships, and U.S. Army
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watercraft, have been analyzed and compared. The results of
this analysis are in the form of decision policies that if
followed by the ordnance manager ensure that the most cost
effective method of transportation is being used for the
given number and type of missiles that need to be
transported. If a mix of missile types are being shipped,
greater efficiencies can be achieved by loading multiple
missile types on the same vehicle, thus reducing the total
cost.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Commercial assets are the most cost effective
The two military options are almost always quite
inefficient relative to the commercial alternatives . The
AOE option is always inferior to commercial alternatives,
and in only one context is the LSV option found to be
superior to the commercial alternatives.
Only one of the graphs of cost curves generated during
the analysis shows that LSVs should be employed to transport
missiles . That graph is for transporting Harpoon missiles
from NWS Earle to NWS Yorktown. All the other graphs show
that the LSV option will cost more than the commercial
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assets for any number of missiles. The phenomenon seen with
Harpoon missiles going south is caused because the cost per
missile to load and offload Harpoons from and to commercial
assets is greater than to load or offload them via LSV. All
of the graphs show that the AOE transportation method should
only be utilized as a last resort because of the high costs
incurred when loading and offloading at anchorage.
2. LSV's should generally not be utilized as a pure
cost saving method of transportation
While researching the use of LSV s the author was told
that there had been a substantial savings by using LSVs to
transport ordnance over commercial trucks . This savings was
in money that would have come from the SWT fund and did not
take into account the cost to the RSS&I fund, which covers
the ordnance handling at the weapons stations. This
analysis shows that even though money is saved from the SWT
fund there is a greatly increased burden on the RSS&I fund,
which is pushed to it's limits already. Therefore,
utilizing LSVs purely on a cost saving basis is not the best
way to do business. Although, when the other benefits of
using this asset are weighed into the decision process,
i.e., training for both Army and Navy units, then the
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overall benefits from using this asset may overcome the
additional costs to the RSS&I budget
.
3 . AOEs should not be utilized as missile
transportation methods
In all the analysis cases, the option of AOE was the
most cost prohibitive because of two reasons. The first was
that the rental cost (one way transit cost) was so much
higher than the other methods; the second was due to the
load and unload cost per missile being greater than the
other methods . These two factors caused the cost curves for
AOEs to intercept the y-axis at a higher point and to have
higher slopes than the other methods, thus preventing the
AOE cost curves from crossing the other cost curves no
matter how many missiles were to be transported. This
result would be the same for using an AE since the rental
cost for an AE is approximately the same as an AOE. Also,
the load and unload costs would be the same since the AE
would have to load and unload the missiles at anchorage.
C. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
1. Use of Side-opening Containers
The trend within the DoD is to use 20 -foot side -opening
containers when transporting ordnance. The major advantage
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these containers have over the end-opening ones is ease of
access. Since the whole side of the container can be
opened, positioning of the ordnance is much easier, thus
reducing the time needed to load and unload the containers.
No capacity data was available for the missiles discussed in
this thesis so this option was not analyzed. A comparison
of this method with the other possible methods could be
accomplished after the load capacities were determined.
2 . Mixed Loads
The analysis done in this thesis focused on each type
of missile separately. Further analysis could take place in
determining the best method of transportation given that
multiple types of missiles could be carried on a given
method at the same time, i.e., both Sparrows and Sidewinders
on a 48 -foot flatbed truck. Theoretically, some




APPENDIX A - DATA USED IN ANALYSIS
The tables listed below show the data utilized during
the analysis . They show the transportation rates associated
with the different transportation methods, and the load and














Ref. 14, "Ref. 16, *** Ref . 17
Table 7. Transportation Rates
$/mannr mannr/missiie ^/missile
Harpoon 111.57 11.45 $1,277.48
Phoenix 111.57 3 $ 334.71
Sidewinder 111.57 0.62 $ 69.17
sparrow lll.b/ 1.36 $ 151.74
Table 8 . Loading at Yorktown
(Commercial Methods) . [Ref. 12]
$/mannr mannr/missiie $/missne
Harpoon 111.57 7.83 $ 873.59
Phoenix 111.57 2.05 $ 228.72
Sidewinder 111.57 0.42 $ 46.86
sparrow 111.57 0.93 $ 103. 76
Table 9. Loading at Earle (Commercial
Methods) . [Ref. 12]
$/manhr manhr/missile $/missile
Harpoon 111.5/ 16.55 $1,846.48
Phoenix 111.57 4.34 $ 484.21
Sidewinder 111.57 0.89 $ 99.30
sparrow 111.5/ 1.96 $ 218.68
Table 10. Unloading at Yorktown
(Commercial Methods) . [Ref. 12]
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$/mannr mannr/missile $/missiie
Harpoon 111.57 3.58 $ 399.42
Knoemx 111.57 0.94 $ 104.88
Sidewinder 111.57 0.19 $ 21.20
sparrow 111.5/ U.4Z $ 46.86
Table 11. Unloading at Earle
(Commercial Methods) . [Ref . 12]
LOAD (5/missile) UNLUAU($/missne)
Harpoon $ 1,108.66 $ 1,001.86
Phoenix $ 537.74 $ 485.94
Sidewinder $ 118.72 $ 107.29
sparrow $ 335.22 $ 302.92
Table 12 . LSV load/unload costs at
Earle. [Ref. 15]
LOAD ($/missiie) UNLOAD($/missile)
Harpoon $ 1,108.66 $ 1,001.86
Phoenix $ 537.74 $ 485.94
Sidewinder $ 118.72 $ 107.29
Sparrow $ 335.22 $ 302.92
Table 13 . LSV laod/unload costs at
Yorktown. [Ref. 15]
luau ($/missue) UNLOAL)($ymissile)
Harpoon $ 1,108.66 $ 1,001.86
Phoenix $ 537.74 $ 485.94
Sidewinder $ 118.72 $ 107.29
Sparrow $ 335.22 $ 302.92
Table 14 . AOE load/unload costs at
Earle. [Ref. 15]
luau (^/missile) UNLoALXS/missile)
Harpoon $ 6,375.97 $ 9,059.40
Phoenix $ 5,762.66 $ 7,064.24
Sidewinder $ 5,312.54 $ 5,599.90
sparrow $ 5,545.10 $ 6,356.4/
Table 15. AOE load/unload costs at Golf
anchorage. [Ref. 15]
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APPENDIX B - SPREADSHEET LAYOUT
The following is the spreadsheet layout used to
generate the cost curves for transporting Harpoons from NWS
Earle to NWS Yorktown. The layouts for the other seven
missile/transportation method combinations are similar.
mmmmsmsm*
-—V -M5WM0S. :-.; ,! |-; ?-•'• tUWJ . UUKftUlV ! ..:.-- fi*» UtWiWJVti
TRUCKyWTH:«JFfRAISED $ 2.72008$ 8/a.by % 1.84S.48" $ 1.42/.UU 5 aiiwj a
TRucKwrmcowiw^ - $ 873.59 $ 1.846.48 $ 1.401.00 $ 9260 6 $ 2,720.08
RWIWTH4awrCONTAWEFt $ 873.59 $ 1.846.48 $ 2.830.00 S 9260 24 $ 2,720.08





$ 1,108.66 $ 1,00186 $ 11.500.00 750 $ 2.110.52
^AOE : -: $ 1.108 66 $ 9.05940 $ 26.506 12 750 $ 10,168.05
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APPENDIX C - EXAMPLE OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
The following is an example of the data points
generated from the cost curve equations . This example is
for transporting Harpoon missiles from NWS Earle to NWS
Yorktown.
SOUIHCOli! t-UKVt UA l^^W^^^




"~r s ' 4.2ay:bB J " 4,213 &'a J b.tJ4y bt! S b.t!42.B8
'
J ' 13 B10.&2 '$ 3b,B/4.18
2"
s y.yby /b $ u.yaa./b $ 8.3t>2./6 5 8,3(>y./b S lb 121 04 J 46.842 24
3 j y.u/y 83 $ y.bba Hi J 11, UB2.Ua Si 11.08283 $ 1/ 831 Sb Si s/.uio.au
4 $ i2.3yy yi S 12,3/3.yi S 13.8U2 yi 5 13,802.91 S 19 y42.U8 5 67.1/8.36'
b $ lb. 119. 99 S 1b.U93.9y s ib.b22.yy 5 1b,b22.99 Si 22 Ub2.6U 5 ll.'UH. 4'1
6 $ 1/. 840. lib 5 W,814.Ut> S iy,243 Ub $ 19,243.06 S 24 1B3 12 S 8/.S1448
7 $ 20.660 14 5 22.02/74 S 21.963.14 J 21.963.14 $ 25 2/3 f>4 S 9/. 682. 64
8 j 23.28U:n $ 24.74/82 $ 24.683 22 S 24,683.22 S 28 384 16 J 10/.8bU.6U
..... ,g,
5 a/.bia.yu J 'J/,4b/.y(J 5 2/.403.2y J 2/,4u3.^y S 30 494 bB 3i 118. 018. b6
10 $ ao.aau.H/ s au.ia/.y/ 5. au, 123.3/ J 30,123.3/ * it bUS 7U I 1^8. IBb/^
n S 32,9bU Ub $ 32,90S.0s % 32,843 4b Si 32.843.4b 5 34 /lb/2 S 138.364/8
' 12 «: ab.BSU 13 I 3S.t2B 13 5 3b.bb"3.b2 S 3b.bS3.b2 J 36 825 24 5! 148.622 84
13 $ 38.400 20 5 39.841.81 5 38.283 60 3, 38.283.60 5 38 93b /6 $ 168.690 90
14 5 41.120.28 $ 42,bbl 88 J 41.003.68 J 41.U03.68 J 41 U4/.28 S 168.868 96
"Ts"1 Si 43.840.B6 s 4b.^m yb !t i'i.ri'i lk> % 43,/23./b S 43 lb/ 80 5 1/9.U2/.02
16 J 46.bbU.43 S 4s,UU2 u:j % 46.443.83 S 46.443.83 S 4b 2B8 32 s> lay, 19b. uu
17 S sU.BOO 11 Si SU./22.11 S 49.163.91 J 49,153.9! 1 4/ 3/8 84 S 199.363 14
...
,, g J s3.s20 19 $ SlM^.ly S bl.883.98 5 bl.883.98 5 49 489 3S 5 209.631.20
1"9 J sb\240 2fe' J b/.bbb.S/ S S4.bU4.Ub S S4.6U4 Ub * si byy 88 5 2iy.byy 26
20 S b8.ybCJ.34 5 60,3/b.94 I b/, 324. 14 5 b/. 324. 14 $ b3 /10.40 3! 229. 8t>/ 32
<;i S bl.«8U.42 S 63,Uyb.U2 S 60.u44.21 S bU, 044.2! J bb 820 92 &' 240, 03b. 38
22 J 64.4UU 4y J Bb.Blb.lO $ 52./b4.29 Si t>2,/b4.29 J s/ 931.44 S 260.203 44
n S b7.120.b/ 5 (>8.b3b.1/ » b5.4B4 3b Si bb.4B4.3b 5 60 041 96 Si 250.3/1 bU
24 S 69.840 bb $ M,26B.a8 J H8.2U4.44 Si B8.2U4.44 $ t>2 162 48 $ 2/U.63y.bB
*s J /4.U8U.33 $ /s. 469.93 $ 11.64/ -\l % /3.84/.12 S t>4 263 00 Si 'JUU./U/ti'A
25 S /b.BUlMO $ /a.iyu.ui $ /b.Sb/ .ZU 1i /U,bBI.20 Si bb 'il'i.b'l 5 290,8/b.b8
Zl $ /9.S20 45 S 8U.91U.08 5 Z9.28/.2/ S /9.28/.2Z S 68 484 04 S 301.043/4
28 Si «2.24U.bb S 83.630.16 J 82. 00/. 3b J 82. 00/. 3b J /O 694 56 J 311,211 8U
" 29" $ 84.95U.63 j sb.iibu :n S 84, I'll 43 S B4./2/.43 * 72 /us.ua * 3^1,3/y Bb
30 $ a/.beU /I $ tjy.o/o.ai * B^.44C.5U S B/.44/.SU * /4 BIS bU * 331,S4/.a^
31 5 90.4UO./9 s ya.283 99 S 9U,lb/.b8 Si 9U.16/.S8 Si /6 925 12 S 341. /Is. 98
32 S 93.12U8b s yb.U040/ S 9i!.BB/ bb Si ay.BU/.bB Si r'y 03b 54 5 361.88404
33 J 9/.3BU 64 $ 98. /24.1b 5 9b. BUZ I'i Si ab.t>U/./3 Si 81 14/. lb S 362. 062.10
34 $ 100.080 62 $ 101.444 22 I 98,32/81 Si 98,32/81 $ 83 2b/ 58 5 3/2.220 16
35 » !Ui!,BUU CU X 1U4,lt>4 :m 3i iui,04/.as s 101,04/ aa 5! 8b 3b'8 2U Si 382.388.22
3b J 10b. &2U.// $ 106,884.38 S 103. ZBZ 9B Si 103. IHI.96 S 8/ 4/8/2 5 392.666 28
37 X 11)8.240 8b S 111. 098.UIJ $ 1Ub,4a8 U4 S 1U6.4UU.04 % aa say '^4 $ 4U^./if4 34
38 S 11U.9B0U3 J 113,818.13 $ 1Uy.2U8 12 Si 109,208.12 J 91 baa./b X 412.892 40
39 J 1l3.6'al UU $ 1iy.b38.21 S 111,928 19 Si 111.92819 'I 93 810 28 $ 423.UbU.4b
40 $ llb.4U1.U8 S 1iy,2b8.2a » 114.6487/ S 114,b4B.^l' » as y^u.au S 4337^8 S^
4T J 12U.B4U /y $ 121,9/8.36 » ll/.3ba.35 S 11/. 358. 3b $ ye 031.32 Si 443. 39b. S8
42 $ 123.36'U 84 S 124,698 44 Si 1^U.U88.42 S 120,088.42 $ 10U 141.84 $ 4b3.b64.64
43 X 12b.UBl).yi 5 128,912 12 5 122. 808. bu S 122.HU8.su $ 102 262 3b $ 4B3./32./0
44 $ 128.80099 S 131.B32.2U S 12b,b28b8 5! 12s.s28.sB S 1U4 3b<i.BB $ 4/3,900. /6
4b $ iai.b21.0/ $ l34,3b2.2/ S 128,248 6b $ 128.248Bb $ lUb 4/3 4U » 484,Ub8.8^
4B" $ 134.241. 14 5 13/, 0/2. 3b S 130.9B8./3 5 130,968/3 $ 1UB b83.92 * 4M4. ^36.88
4/ 5 13b, 961 22 J 139, 792.43 S 133.688.81 J 133,688.81 S 110 ba4 44 Si S04.404 94
48 J 139,681 30 $ 142.b12.b0 5 136.408 88 S 136.408 88 5 112 804 96 5 614,b/3.UU
49'
s 143.y2u.y8 J 14b, /2b. 18 S 142. Obi SB S> 142.Ubl.bB J 114 yib 4H S 524./41 U6
b0 S 14b.b41.ua $ 14a. 445. 2B $ 144,//l.b4 5! 144.//1.B4 S 11/ Ui!b.UU 5 b34.90y.12
bl $ 149.aB1.13 $ lb2.1Bb.33 $ 14/.491/2 Si 14/.491/2 Si 119 135.62 $ S4S.U//.18
57 S 1bl2.U81.20 $ 1s4.Bb6\41 $ 1bU.i!11./U Si 1bU,211./9 S 121 247 04 % bbb.246.24
b3 S 164.801 28 5 lb/. BOB. 49 5 162.931 8/ S 1b2,931 8/ $ 123 367.66 5 SbS. 4133U
s4 * is/.s;!l 3b $ lbU.3ii6.S6 Si 1bb.bSl.ys $ ISS.bSI.MS S l^S 46B.UB $ S/S,581.3b
S3 X 150.241 43 S lb4.s4U 'U 5 1b8.3/2.02 5 lb8.372.02 S 12/ 6/8. BO S 5BS./'4y.4i;
sb" J 162. 961. bl 5 16/. 250. 32 $ 161,092.10 S 161,092.10 Si 129 bBa.i;; J b9b,91/48
b/ S 16/.2UV19 S 169. 98U 4U S 163,812 18 S 163,812 18 J 131 /yg.64 $ 60B.U8b.b4
SB 5 169.921.2/ $ 1/2,700.4/ S 1b6.b32.2b $ 166, 632. 2b $ 133 910.16 S b1C.253.UU
b9 5 1/2.B41.34 4 1CS.4:<!U.SS » Iba.iiS^ 33 Si 169,262.33 S 136 020.58 $ 626.421 66
BD $ Wb.3Bl.42 S l/8.140.t>3 Si 1/1.9/2.41 S 1/1,9/2.41 S 138 131.20 $ 635.689/2
61 % WB.U81.bU % 18^,3b4 31 5 1/4.692 48 S 1/4,by2 48 5 140 241/2 Si 646. /b/ l&
62 $ ISO, BUI S/ $ 18b,U/4.3B Si 1//.41i!.bt> S l//,412.St> Si 142 362.24 Si 6by.y2b.e4
63 S 183. b21 6b $ 18/, /94.4b 5 180.13264 $ 180.132.54 S 144 462. /t> S> bB/,093 90
64 $ 186,241/3 S 19U,b14.b4 5 182,8b2./l 5 182,862/1 Si 14b b/3.28 s; b//.2bi yb
6b S 190.481 41 $ 193,234.61 S 18b, b/2 /9 S 18b,b/2./9 S 148 bS3.BU J 68/. 430. 02
'66' $ 193.2U1 48 5 19b,9S4.t>9 5 188,29286 S 188,292 86 5 1i>0 /a4.3^ $ 697.69808
b/ $ 19b. 921. Sb 5 20U, 168.3/ $ iyi,012.94 S 191,012 94 $ 162 9U4.84 5 /0/./bb'.14
68 $ iaa.641 64 $ 2U2.8B8.4b Si iy3./33.U2 Si 1S3./33.U2 Si Ibb Ulb. 36 Si /I/.934 20
59 $ 2U1.3U1./1 $ 20b. 608 b2 5 19B.4b30y * lSb.4S3.Ua $ Is/ 12b 88 Si /28.1U2.2b
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